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An Interdisciplinary Introduction to
Legal Transparency: A Tool for
Rational Development
William B. T. Mock'
I.

Introduction

Transparency is a specialized term in international economic
law. It is a key concept in various GATWf and WIO 3 agreements,
in World Bank 4 and IMF 5 studies and in numerous bilateral and

1. Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International and
Comparative Studies, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL. This article is
partially based upon remarks given at the Law Faculty of the University of
Cagliari, Sardinia, Italy during March, 1998, when the author was a Visiting
Scholar. The author especially wishes to thank Donna Bade, Esq. (JMLS J.D.
1998, LL.M. in International Business and Trade Law 2000), for her substantial
research assistance. Other research assistants whose work contributed to this
article, and who deserve recognition and thanks, are Stefanie Juster (JMLS J.D.
1999, LL.M. in International Business and Trade Law 2000) and Joo Hee Jun
(JMLS J.D. 1999). The author also wishes to thank Laura Lynn Michaels, Esq.
for her continuing support of his research.
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS- RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 1 (1994), 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter FINAL ACT]. See, e.g., Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary And Phytosanitary Measures, Annex 1A, Art. 7, FINAL
ACT, supra; Agreement On Preshipment Inspection, Annex 1A, Art. 2, FINAL
ACT, supra. See also General Agreement on Trade in Services, FINAL ACT, 33
I.L.M. 44, *50; Dispute Prevention and Settlement of the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Art. 63, Part V, FINAL ACT, 33
I.L.M. 1226.
3. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing The World Trade Organization, The
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal
Texts, 20 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
4. Edgardo Boeninger, Governance and Development: Issues and
Constraints, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 267 (1991).
GEORGE KOPITS & JON CRAIG, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
5.
TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (1998).
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multilateral agreements on investment and rights to establish
businesses in foreign countries.
Transparency is also a concept which has been analyzed

extensively under such disciplines as game theory6 , information
theory7 , development theory8 , and political economy 9.

Using

insights from some of these areas, I will look at transparency in
international economic law and seek to bring new meaning to our
understanding of this concept. I will conclude with some remarks
about the role of transparency and the rule of law in economic
development.

As outlined, this is an ambitious agenda - one worthy of
many extended scholarly works. In this brief article, however, I

attempt to do no more than sketch some key intellectual links that
have been overlooked in mainstream legal scholarship. In doing
so, I hope to spark some of my colleagues in legal scholarship to
pursue related interdisciplinary work, encompassing such fields as
information theory, game theory, and political economy. Were
these fields to be incorporated into law as the discipline of

6. "Game Theory provides economists with a systematic way of analysing
problems of strategicbehaviour
where one agent's actions depend essentially on what other agents may do."
JOHN EATWELL, ET AL., THE NEW PALGRAVE:: GAME THEORY xi (1989)
[hereinafter THE NEW PALGRAVE]. "Game theory is the study of the rational
behavior of decision-makers whose decisions affect each other." David E.
Leebron, A Game Theoretic Approach to the Regulation of Foreign Direct
Investment and the Multinational Corporation, 60 CINN. L. REV. 305 (1991).
"Game theory provides a way to formalize social structures and examine the
effects of structure on individual decisions." JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY
FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 1 (1994).
7. Information theory is the field of study of systems of information
transmission, acquisition, and analysis. A seminal article in sparking the
development of modern information theory is George J. Stigler, The Economics
of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). For a history of information theory,

see Dan Schiller, How to Think About Information, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF INFORMATION 28-41 (Vincent Mosco, Janet Wasko, eds., 1988).
8. Development theory is the field of study of economic, social, and political
development, with primary attention to those nations shifting from command
economies to market economies and to Third World nations. For a good
summary of development theory and development issues, see KEMPE RONALD
HOPE, SR., DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD: FROM POLICY FAILURE TO

POLICY REFORM 3-24 (1996).
REFORMING

See also BARRY P. BOSWORTH & GUR OFER,

PLANNED ECONOMIES

IN AN INTEGRATING

WORLD ECONOMY

(1995).
9. Political economy is the field of study of the interplay between economics
and political action. See, e.g., AVINASH K. DIXIT, THE MAKING OF ECONOMIC
POLICY: A TRANSACTION-COST POLITICS PERSPECTIVE (1996); BERNARD
HOEKMAN & MICHEL KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD

TRADING SYSTEM: FROM GATT TO WTO (1995).
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economics has been in recent decades, the potential for the
development of legal theory and practice is vast. Demonstrating
the truth of this statement must await later writings; this article
seeks merely to point one direction in which such exploration may
take us.
II.

The Basic Meaning of "Transparency"

As used in legal practice and theory, "transparency" is a term
of analogy. A regulation or law is to be transparent if the process
and the effects of the regulation or law can been seen through
easily, just as one can see easily through a clean window. If
someone subject to the law can understand what is expected of
her, can understand and comply with the commands of the law,
and can foresee the consequences of compliance or noncompliance, then the law is transparent"l If not, then the law is
opaque.
III. Use of "Transparency" in International Economic Law
In many international economic law studies, treaties, and
conventions, transparency plays a major role. Transparency is
regularly recognized as a key element in governmental reform and
development." Within the GATT/WTO system, transparency is
one of the major concepts, along with such concepts as national
treatment 2 and most-favored nation status. 3 In bilateral treaties

10. "Clear operating rules and a free flow of information assist economic
decision making, reduce uncertainty, and increase confidence in the legitimacy of
a government (whether democratic or not)." ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
GOVERNANCE: PROMOTING SOUND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT 34 (1997).
11. "Transparency in government operations is widely regarded as an
important precondition for the macroeconomic fiscal sustainability, good
governance, and overall fiscal rectitude." KoPITS & CRAIG, supra note 5, at 1.
12. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Art. XVII, Annex 1B,
FINAL ACT, 33 I.L.M. 1180; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Art. 1-8, Annex 1C, FINAL ACT 33 I.L.M. 1198.
13. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Art. 12, Part IV, Annex
1A, FINAL ACT supra note 2; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, Art. 27, Annex 1A, FINAL ACT supra note 2; General Agreement on
Trade in Services, Art. II, Annex 1B, FINAL ACT, 33 I.L.M. 1169; Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Art. 4, Part I, Annex 1C,
FINAL ACT 33 I.L.M. 1194.
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of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, 4 as well as bilateral
investment treaties," transparency is a central concept.
Within the GATT/WTO system, several examples of the
importance of transparency can be observed. One example is
present in the principle that all non-tariff barriers should be
converted to equivalent tariff barriers 16. This is not because tariff
barriers have less of an effect upon trade, but because that effect is
more obvious. In other words, tariff barriers are more transparent
than quotas and other non-tariff barriers. 7
Being more obvious produces three positive effects. First,
businesspeople can take those effects into account in advance.
Second, more persons affected by the tariff barrier will understand
its impact upon them, including consumers paying for the goods.
Third, nations will be able to adopt more principled negotiating
positions once they are aware of the true economic significance of
the barriers.
Within the context of bilateral investment treaties,
transparency works in a similar way. An essential part of every
bilateral investment treaty is that each state's foreign nationals be
allowed substantial freedom to invest and conduct financial
business in the other nation. Such freedom can be frustrated if
14. See e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, April 2, 1953,
United States-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. no. 2863; Document III-E, Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Between the United States and Japan
(Sample FCN Treaty), I.E.L. III-E (1989); Herman Walker, Jr., Modern Treaties
of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805 (1958); The
function of these treaties is often now served by the Treaties "Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, with Protocol."
15. See e.g., Investment Treaty with Albania, K.A.V. 4384, S. Treaty Doc.
104-19, Jan. 11, 1995 (identified in the Presidential letter of submittal to the
Senate as the paragraph which "ensures the transparency of each Party's
regulation of covered investments.") Similar provisions may be found in the
Investment Treaty with Trinidad and Tobago, K.A.V. 4973, Sept. 26, 1994, and
the Investment Treaty with Uzbekistan, K.A.V. 4251, S. Treaty Doc. 104-25, Dec.
16, 1994.
16. GATT, supra note 2, Art. XI, U.N.T.S. at 224-26, See also, Agreement on
Agriculture, Art. 5, Para. 1, Annex 1A, FINAL ACT, 33 I.L.M. 1144.
17. "For import control systems based on clearly defined product quotas,
there are various well-tried methods of phasing out quotas that have the
important advantages of being reasonably transparent and open to monitoring."
VINOD THOMAS, JOHN NASH, ET. AL.,

BEST PRACTICES IN TRADE POLICY

REFORM 158 (1991).
See also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE
DIFFICULTY OF QUANTIFYING NOM-TARIFF MEASURES AFFECTING TRADE,

GAO/NSIAD-85-133 (1985).
18. See e.g., "Neither Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable and
discriminatory measures the management, conduct, operation, and sale or other
disposition of covered investments." Investment Treaty with Albania, Art. II.
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the right to invest is subject to complex and confusing regulations
directed at the foreign investor, particularly because these
regulations could provide an opportunity to favor the local

investor over the foreign one. 9 Similarly, the freedom to invest
can be frustrated if foreign investors are subject to officials who
are free to exercise a large degree of discretion in approving or
disapproving the investment. Thus, both confusing regulation and

large grants of administrative discretion are barriers to transparency and amount to violations of most bilateral investment
treaties.
IV. Game Theory
Game theory is a mathematical discipline which seeks to

understand the choices and strategies available to parties engaged
in structured negotiations or competition with each other. °
"Games" includes all types of structured interactions with defined
rewards, not merely the games we play when gathered with friends

for a relaxed evening.

Examples of items analyzed by game

theory include police questioning of a criminal suspect, 21 job
Para. 3(b), supra note 15. Similarly see, Investment Treaty with Uzbekistan, Art.
II, Para. 3(b), supra note15; Investment Treaty with Trinidad and Tobago, Art.
II, Para. 3(b), supra note 15.
19. "[Floreign investors suffer from a condition of adverse asymmetry in
information costs compared to insiders. Thus, foreign investors' decisions on the
location of their activities within a host country mainly reflect a ration response
to the existence of information costs." Sergio Mariotti and Lucia Piscitello,
Information Costs and Location of FDIs with the Host Country: Empirical
Evidence From Italy, 26 J. INT'L Bus. STUDIES 815, 815 (1995).
20. "This history of game theory has been one of continual expansion of the
structured situations susceptible to cogent analysis." William B.T. Mock, Game
Theory, Signalling, and InternationalLegal Relations, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 33 (1992). Moreover, the growth of game theory can be seen
throughout the twentieth century. For a technical historical summary of the
development of game theory, see R.J. Aumann, Game Theory, in THE NEW
PALGRAVE supra note 6, at 460-79. Today, von Neumann and Morgenstern's
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior remains the most influential work
applying modem game theory to the social sciences.
21. WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA (1992)(looking at police
interrogations, "who shall die" ultimata, and many other aspects of the history
and analysis of the prisoner's dilemma problem); see also, Anatol Rapoport,
Prisoner's Dilemma, in THE NEW PALGRAVE supra note 6, at 199; JOHN
MCMILLAN, GAME THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 42-28 (1986). The
Supreme Court's regulation of police interrogation for suspects under custodial
arrest in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and the development of the
exclusionary rule for illegally obtained evidence, beginning with the now
antiquated case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), have effectively turned
an isolated series of one-time custodial games, with a finite duration, into "Mutt
and Jeff" games (or "good cop" and "bad cop" ) with an indefinite duration.
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hunting, product pricing in a competitive business market,2 3 tort
24

2

law, and arms control negotiations.25 Such popular games as
bridge and chess are also studied in game theory,26 of course, and
often provide useful examples for discussion.
Within game theory, scholars distinguish between different
types of games. For example, games that occur only once are
distinguished from games that the players play again and again.27
Games where players cooperate for a shared reward are
And, most
distinguished from games where they compete. 2'

importantly for a study of transparency, scholars distinguish
between games of "imperfect information" and games of "perfect

information."2 9

Mock, supra note 20, at 39.
22. JEFFREY S. BANKS, SIGNALING GAMES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 9 ff. (1991)
(citing thereinMICAHEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING, 1974)
23. MORROW, supra note 6, at 51-58 (Cuban Missile Crisis), at 180-186
(Nuclear Deterrence).
24. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER, AND RANDAL C. PICKER,
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 19-49 (1994).
25.
See, e.g. Kenneth W. Abbott, 'Trust But Verify': The Production of
Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26
CORNELL INT'L L. J., 1 (1993); Martin C. McGuire, Defence Economics, in THE
NEW PALGRAVE, supra note 6, at 760-62 (indicating the "need for economic
analysis became crucial from the early days of the strategic nuclear era"); R.P.
Smith, Military Expenditure, in THE NEW PALGRAVE, supra note 6, at 463-65
("Economists have also played an important, though controversial, role in the
technical development of strategic doctrine, deterrence theory, nuclear targeting
and other aspects of the uses to which military expenditure is put."). See also,
BATES GILL AND J.N. MAK, ARMS, TRANSPARENCY AND SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1 (1997).
26. It is assumed throughout this article that readers are familiar with bridge
and chess. For those readers who are not familiar with these games, however, a
basic discussion of the fundamental concepts can be found in HOYLE'S RULES OF
GAMES: DESCRIPTIONS OF INDOOR GAMES OF SKILL AND CHANCE, WITH ADVICE
ON SKILFUL PLAY - BASED ON THE FOUNDATIONS LAID DOWN BY EDMOND
HOYLE, 1672-1769, 1-33, 213-220 (Albert H. Morehead & Geoffrey Mott-Smith
eds., 2d ed. 1983) (discussing the rules of bridge and chess, respectively).
27. Jean-Francois Mertens, Repeated Games, in THE NEW PALGRAVE, supra
note 6, at 205.
28. JAMES W. FRIEDMAN, GAME THEORY WITH APPLICATIONS TO
ECONOMICS, 22-67 (1986). See also, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. Non-Cooperative
Games, in THE NEW PALGRAVE at 178; A. Mas-Collel, Cooperative Equilibrium,
in THE NEW PALGRAVE at 95; and Martin Shubik, Oscar Morgenstern in THE
NEW PALGRAVE at 103; MORROW, supra note 6, at 188-218.
29. These terms are somewhat different than the terms "complete
information" and "incomplete information." According to one scholar,
The players are said to have "imperfect" information when
there is uncertainty about the actual behavior of the players or,
more generally, when the evolution of the play until the point
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Within any game context, a participant or player will have
certain information. In the beginning of any bridge game, the
player will know what cards he holds in his hand. However, he
will not know how the remaining cards are distributed among the
other three hands. As the bidding progresses, he will be able to
gain additional information and reach some conclusions to guide
his play. Only at the end of the hand will the average player
finally know all there is to know about how the cards were
distributed. Bridge is a game of imperfect information.
Contrast this with chess. In chess, each player knows at all
times the complete placement of all the pieces on the chessboard.
No information is hidden at any time. Chess is a game of perfect
information.
Games of perfect information differ from games of imperfect
information in several very important ways. In games of imperfect
information, it becomes necessary to analyze all available
information to learn about the information that is unavailable. °
In games of perfect information, this is not necessary. Games of
imperfect information therefore permit the development of
techniques of signaling,3' where a player will provide some
additional information to partners or opponents. In bridge,
players signal with their bids and the cards they play on each trick.
In games of perfect information, it is neither necessary nor
possible to signal information to other players.32
This leads to the most important distinction for this article. In
a game of imperfect information, false signalling-bluffing or
deception-is possible." In bridge, an unusual bid or card played
can convey false information to an opponent. In chess, no move
can deceive an opponent about the actual layout of the pieces and
in time when a new decision is to be made is not known. ...
On the contrary, information is "incomplete" when the players
do not know some of the elements which define the rules of
the game itself. These rules include the set of payoffs, the set
of strategies, and the number of players.
Louis PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION 9 (1988). For a
more technical treatment of this distinction, see FREIDMAN, supra note 28 at sec.
2.1.2, p. 9. More generally, see MORROW, supra note 6 at 219-259.
30. See Weber, Games with Incomplete Information, THE NEW PALGRAVE
supra note 6 at 149; Leonard J. Mirman, Perfect Information, THE NEW
PALGRAVE supra note 6, at 194; MORROW, supra note 6, at 219.
31. See JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES
AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 51-55.

32. See id. at 51-52.
33. See id at 53-55. (In this book, bluffing goes by the more precise term
"inverted signalling"). See also, Mock supra note 20, at 39.
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the threats inherent in that layout. Although weaker players may
believe that it is important to know an opponent's intentions,
stronger players are aware that it is the potential risks and
opportunities on the chessboard that matter, not any plans the
opponent may make. In chess and other games of perfect
information, it is impossible to deceive an opponent.
V.

Relating Game Theory to Law

Applying these insights of game theory to law provides us
with some additional understanding of the concept of transparency. First, game theory provides an additional means for
defining transparency.
Second, game theory provides new
sophistication in understanding the importance and effects of
transparency.
By their nature, areas of legal regulation provide a system of
defined actors, rules, and rewards (both positive and negative).
Such areas are therefore natural subjects of game theory analysis34
and the concepts of perfect and imperfect information and of
signalling and false signalling may be applied to an analysis of
law.
Broadly speaking, we may say that the closer an area of
regulation is to providing those subject to regulation with perfect
information about the standards of conduct and the consequences
of their actions, the more transparent the regulation is.
Conversely, the more a party subject to regulation is required to
seek signals about the law's requirements and effects, the less
transparent it is. Examples of such signal-seeking are the efforts
of investors in developing countries to judge the safety of their
investments from the nuances of the statements of politicians and
bureaucrats, rather than from the words of the law or regulation
itself.
VI. Insights from Information Theory
Information theory is a relatively recent discipline which
seeks to analyze and understand the role, processes, and costs of
information gathering and analysis in modern society." Adding
34. For several examples of game theory analysis of law, see BAIRD, supra
note 24.
35. See id. at 122.
36. Dan Schiller, How to Think About Information, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF INFORMATION, 27 (Vincent Mosco, Janet Wasko, eds., 1988). See
also, George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213

HeinOnline -- 18 Dick. J. Int'l L. 300 1999-2000

2000]

INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL TRANSPARENCY

some insights from information theory to our current
understanding of transparency will provide us with an important
additional element in understanding the role of transparency in
law and development.37
As the world has come to realize, information is a valuable
commodity. Nations, businesses, and individuals spend large sums
of money to acquire it. Intellectual property laws provide

monopoly protections to inventors for revealing information; spy
satellites are launched to obtain it; the World Wide Web is visited

by million of people daily in search of it. If knowledge is power, it
is worth spending time and money to obtain it.
There are several opportunities for costs to arise in obtaining
information, because information gathering has several phases."

First, information must be located. Then, it must be acquired.
Then, it must be confirmed. Then, it must be analyzed. Only then
may it be applied in a productive manner.
At each phase, an information-seeker may incur costs.

If

information is not located in a convenient site, a seeker may have
to do substantial work to find it - in effect, incur a secondary
information cost to locate a source for the primary information.
Once information has been located, there may be a significant cost
involved in acquiring it. If there is any reason to doubt the
reliability of the information, the seeker may have to spend time
and money confirming the accuracy and reliability of it. Finally,

the seeker must devote additional resources to analyzing the
(1961); MICHAEL BUCKLAND, INFORMATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS (1991);
PHLIPS, supra note 29.
37. For a more thorough analysis of the significance of information law, in
general, and transparency, in particular, and for a review of literature on
information economics, see William B.T. Mock, On the Centrality of Information
Law: A Rational Choice Discussion of Information Law and Official
Transparency,17 J. COMP. & INFO. L. 1069 (1999).
38. Hajime Oniki, The Cost of Communication in Economic Organization:II
in UNCERTAINTY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION 27 (Walter P. Heller, et
al eds., 1986). See also, James R. Green and Jean-Jacaues Laffont, Alternative
Limited Communication Systems: Centralization Versus Interchange of
Information, in UNCERTAINTY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION 255 (Walter
P. Heller, et al eds. 1986); Brian L. Dos Santos, Vijay S. Mookerjee, Expert
System Design; Minimizing Information Acquisition Costs, 9 J. DECISION
SUPPORT SYSTEMS 161, 162 (1993) (stating "Information acquisition costs can
constitute a significant portion of the cost of reaching a decision."); KEITH
DEVLIN, LOGIC AND INFORMATION 18 (1991) (dividing information extraction
into the stages of perception and cognition); Michael L. Tushman & David A.
Nadler, Information Processing as an Integrating Concept In Organizational
Design, 3 ACAD. MANAGEMENT REV. 613, 614 (1978). "Information processing
refers to the gathering, interpreting, and synthesis of information .... "
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information as it applies to her own situation. Only then is the
information of value to the seeker.
VII. Relating Information Theory to Game Theory and Law
When we apply information theory's analysis of information
acquisition costs to game theory and law, important insights will
emerge. In particular, games of perfect and imperfect information
will take on new meaning and the significance of transparency in
economic development will become clear.
Games of imperfect information may now be seen as those
games which impose significant information acquisition costs and
barriers upon the players.
Every meaningful informationgathering situation imposes some costs at the final, analytic phase.
However, significant costs and barriers at the location, acquisition,
and confirmation phases of information-gathering are aspects of
games of imperfect information. In games of perfect information,
these costs are minimal or non-existent.
A transparent legal or regulatory regime is therefore one in
which the information-gathering costs, other than those relating to
analysis, are kept to a minimal level. An opaque legal or
regulatory regime is one which imposes significant informationacquisition costs or barriers upon a party subject to the law or
regulation. Another way to state this is that an opaque legal
regime imposes significant transaction costs on the acquisition of
information about the legal regime itself.
It is highly unlikely that these information-gathering costs in
opaque legal regimes will be borne by anyone other than the
regulated party. In a few countries and a few settings, information
costs are shared by governments, but this is not common. A clear
example of this is the United States' Freedom of Information
Act,39 which requires government agencies to locate and provide
information in its possession to anyone making a proper request.
European-style ombudsmen 4° provide another example where
governments underwrite the cost of providing information.
Therefore, it is normal to expect that opaque legal regimes
would impose significantly greater transaction costs of locating,
39. Freedom of Information Act., 5 U.S.C.A. §552, Pub. L. 89-487, 80 Stat.
250 (1966).
40. See e.g., European Union: Consolidated Version of the Treaty on
European Union and Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, Maastricht, Art. 195, 37 I.L.M. 56 (1997). See also,
Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, Chap. V, Art. 32/B, N.T.I.S. PB91960625.
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gathering, and confirming information than would transparent
legal regimes.
VIII. Conclusion: Transparency, Development, and the Rule of
Law
From the standpoint of a global businessperson, investment in
any country must be judged by the difference between the
financial return and the costs associated with doing business in or
with that country. From our analysis of transparency in law,
games of perfect and imperfect knowledge, and information
acquisition costs, what can we say about the effects of transparent
and opaque legal regimes upon incentives to invest?
Opaque legal regimes create the conditions for regulatory
games of imperfect knowledge. Such games necessarily involve
the possibility of signalling, including false signalling, and
significant costs associated with the location, acquisition, and
confirmation of information of value to the player or regulated
party. In practical terms, this may mean that a market participant
may have to hire expensive local agents to gather regulatory
information, may have to make bribes or "grease payments" to
local officials to obtain interpretations or applications of the law ,4
may have to make a preliminary business move to test the
regulators, and may have to engage in speculation about the intent
of political leaders. All of this is expensive and none of it is a
completely adequate substitute for "perfect" knowledge.42
By contrast, a transparent legal regime imposes none of these
costs. Although there will naturally be costs associated with
ascertaining and evaluating business risks, there will be no or
minimal costs associated with locating, acquiring, and confirming
the regulatory requirements and consequences associated with
investment. A transparent legal regime will provide lower-cost
41. Concern over this reaction to non-transparent overseas regulation of
international business led to enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15
U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2. See also, Recommendation of the Council on Bribery in
International Business Transactions, OECD Doc. C(94) 75/Final (May 27, 1994).
It also led to the creation of Transparency International, an international group
of business people and academics working towards greater transparency for the
reduction of official corruption.
42. "Unless an effective, credible and transparent regulatory system can be
put in place, either via an independent regulator or in some other way, countries
like the developing Asian economies are less likely to be able to continue
NATIONAL
attracting private sector capital, particularly from overseas."
ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, GOVERNANCE AND REGULATORY REGIMES
FOR PRIVATE SECTOR INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT 12 (1998).
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business opportunities and, necessarily, better potential for profit
for businesspeople interested in global business. Whether this
profit potential is left to the businessperson or some of it is
recaptured by the government through taxation is an issue for
another day, but it is clear that a country with a transparent legal
regime will be a more attractive location for investment than the
same country with an opaque legal regime. 43 No nation seeking
development can afford the lost investment associated with
opaque legal regimes.
Legal systems which apply the same rules to every similarlysituated party and avoid both confusing regulation and large
grants of administrative discretion are described as embodying the
Rule of Law. The Rule of Law is often described as a political
good, a worthy aim in the fundamental principles of any legal
system and a necessity in support of human rights. 4" However, our
analysis of transparency, game theory, and information theory
demonstrates that the Rule of Law goes beyond political
philosophy and humanitarian values in law.
A country whose legal system embodies the Rule of Law
necessarily is a transparent legal system. Such a system applies the
same rules to all similarly-situated parties. In doing so, it
dramatically reduces the opportunities for false regulatory
signalling and the costs associated with acquiring legal
information. The Rule of Law lowers transaction costs associated
with international business and investment. By demonstrating
that the Rule of Law has significant economic and practical
consequences, we provide nations, including developing nations,
with self-interested reasons to adopt transparent legal regimes. In
development, the Rule of Law is as much an economic imperative
as a political one.

43. "[I]nvestors and lenders [in developing countries] require a predictable
framework of rules in which commercial activity and lending activity will be
conducted, including accessible and comprehensive legal rules which are actually
applied and the breach of which gives rise to sanctions."
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, GOVERNANCE: PROMOTING SOUND DEVELOPMENT

MANAGEMENT 16 (1997).
44. "An effective rule of law is as fundamental for a free market as it is for
the effective exercise of human rights. The rule of law assures that governments
are truly accountable." Boeninger, supra note 4 at 278.
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